Judicial Deference to Administrative Over-Extension and the End of Environmental Control: Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council {104 S. Ct. 2778} by Wasserman, James M.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 29 Supreme Court Symposium
January 1985
Judicial Deference to Administrative Over-
Extension and the End of Environmental Control:
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council {104 S. Ct. 2778}
James M. Wasserman
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
James M. Wasserman, Judicial Deference to Administrative Over-Extension and the End of Environmental Control: Chevron, U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council {104 S. Ct. 2778}, 29 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 297 (1985)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol29/iss1/13
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ADMINISTRATIVE
OVER-EXTENSION AND THE END OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL:
CHEVRON, U.S.A. v. NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL
The Clean Air Act' has generated considerable controversy and liti-
gation in the more than two decades since its enactment. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency implementation of the Act has been a major
issue in much of the litigation. One significant issue Congress left to
the EPA2 to resolve is the definition of a "source" 3 subject to pollution
control measures under the Act. One possibility is that each individual
1. Pub. L. No. 84-206, 72 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982)). The present form of the Clean Air Act is derived from and incor-
porates legislation dating to the 1950s. The Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 84-
159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955), was the first federal air pollution legislation, providing primar-
ily research assistance. Concern about motor vehicle emissions led to the Motor Vehi-
cle Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86493, 74 Stat. 162 (1960), and the Motor Vehicle Air
Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 (1965), the first direct federal
regulation of air pollution. In 1963 Congress enacted the Clean Air Act, supra, which
left enforcement entirely to the states without effective federal supervision. Congress
unsuccessfully attempted to strengthen the Clean Air Act with the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-675, 80 Stat. 954 (1966), and the Air Quality Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967). Congress significantly restructured
the Clean Air Act in 1970, greatly increasing federal supervision of air pollution control
efforts. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970);
see infra notes 18-25 and accompanying text. A second major transformation occurred
in 1977 with enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95,
91 Stat. 685 (1977). In addition, the Clean Air Act has been amended by The Compre-
hensive Health Manpower Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-157, 85 Stat. 431 (1971), the
Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-319, 88
Stat. 246 (1974), the Safe Drinking Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-190, 91 Stat.
1393, 1399-1405 (1977), and other minor amending legislation.
2. The EPA implements the Clean Air Act on the federal level by statute. The
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84-206, 72 Stat. 392 passim (1963) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), 42 U.S.C. § 4321
(1984), reprinted in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970), established the EPA as an executive agency.
The EPA defines its general function as that of assuring "protection of the environment
by abating and controlling pollution on a systematic basis." 40 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1984).
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point source within a plant, such as a smokestack, is independently
subject to scrutiny and pollution control measures in Act programs. In
contrast, use of the "bubble concept"4 would define a "source" as an
entire plant composed of many point sources which contribute to a
single net emission from a hole in an imaginary "bubble" over the en-
tire plant. In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil Inc.,' the Supreme Court held that the EPA has discretion to use
the bubble concept to define a source for Clean Air Act provisions ap-
plicable to regions' which have not attained National Ambient Air
Quality standards.7
In 1981 the EPA promulgated a new definition of "source"' for
Clean Air Act nonattainment area9 provisions. The new definition al-
lowed plants to maintain or increase pollutant emissions from individ-
ual point sources as long as net total plant emissions do not increase. 10
The EPA is to work with state governments "for the treatment of the environment as a
single interrelated system." Id.
3. For the purpose of this Comment the term "source" is used in a generic sense
unless otherwise indicated. The Clean Air Act refers to and defines the word "source"
in several ways for different programs. See, e.g., § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982) (defines
"stationary sources" and "major statutory sources" for State Implementation Plans);
§ 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (defines a "stationary source" for New Source Performance
Standards as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit
any air pollutant); Title II of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521-34) ("mobile sources");
§ 303(j), 42 U.S.C. § 7603 (defines a "major stationary source" as a "stationary source
or facility" which emits or might emit at least one hundred tons per year of an air
pollutant "except as otherwise provided").
4. See Rhinelander, The Proper Place for the Bubble Concept Under the Clean Air
Act, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,406 (1983); Note, An Overview of the
Bubble Concept, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137 (1982).
5. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
6. State compliance with many Clean Air Act programs is evaluated by perform-
ance within Air Quality Control Regions (AQCR) within a state or an administratively
convenient multistate region. See Clean Air Act, § 110(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1) (1982) (state plan for AQCR air quality); § 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7407) (state responsibility for AQCR air quality).
7. See infra note 19 and accompanying text.
8. The EPA proposed the rule at 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (1981), and published the
final rule at 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981). The regulation is codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.18(j)(1)(i), (ii) (1984). The 1981 regulation replaced a significantly different defini-
tion adopted one year earlier. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
9. A nonattainment area is an air quality control region which does not meet Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards for a particular pollutant. Clean Air Act
§ 172(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(2) (1982). See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
10. 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (1981).
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In response, environmental organizations,1 1 including the Natural Re-
sources Defense Council (NRDC), petitioned the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia 2 for judicial review of the new
regulation. The District of Columbia Circuit Court vacated the regula-
tion as inconsistent with the purposes of Act provisions for nonattain-
ment regions.' 3  In Chevron, the Supreme Court unanimously
reversed,' 4 holding that EPA construction of the Act merited judicial
deference. 15
Although Congress enacted the Clean Air Act in 1963,16 state non-
compliance rendered it ineffective.17 Congress adopted the present
framework of the Act in the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.18 The
1970 Amendments created a complex scheme of joint state and federal
responsibility to improve air quality. The cornerstone of the 1970
Amendments is the requirement that the EPA establish National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for individual pollutants. 19
Congress gave the states responsibility20 and considerable flexibility to
11. The petitioners were the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Citizens for
a Better Environment, Inc., and the Northwestern Ohio Lung Association. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
12. The Clean Air Act provides that only the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia may review EPA actions and regulations. Clean Air Act
§307(bXl), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (1982).
13. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (1982).
14. Six Justices participated in the decision. Justices Marshall, Rehnquist and
O'Connor did not participate.
15. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
16. Pub. L. No. 84-206, 72 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401-7642 (1982)).
17. See Rhinelander, The Bubble Concept: A Pragmatic Approach to Regulation
Under the Clean Air Act, I VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 177 (1981); 116 CONG. REC.
32901 (1970) (comments of Sen. Muskie).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
19. Clean Air Act § 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1982). The Clean Air Amendments of
1970 require the EPA to establish uniform national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards for individual air pollutants. § 109(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d). Primary
ambient air quality standards are those determined to protect public health.
§ 109(bX1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(bXl). Secondary ambient air quality standards specify a
level of pollutant to protect public welfare. § 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). "Wel-
fare" is defined to include a wide range of agricultural, economic, and aesthetic inter-
ests. § 302(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1982). To date the EPA has established NAAQS
for only six pollutants: sulfar oxides, particulates, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen
oxides, and lead. 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4-50.12 (1984).
20. Section 107(a) of the Clean Air Act (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) (1982))
19851
Washington University Open Scholarship
300 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 29:297
attain the NAAQS in a manner responsive to local concerns. The 1970
Amendments required states to develop and carry out State Implemen-
tation Plans (SIPs) to meet NAAQS2" by statutory deadlines.22 The
1970 Amendments also required the EPA to set technology-based23
New Source Performance Standards (NSPS)2" to put strict limits on
emissions from new or modified "sources."25 In theory, limits on new
source emissions will accelerate air quality improvement in regions
subject to NAAQS as polluters replace old equipment with equipment
capable of meeting NSPS.
Because many regions of the country failed to meet initial deadlines
for attaining NAAQS, 2 6 combined with fears of decreasing air quality
in unpolluted regions of the country,27 Congress enacted the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977.28 The 1977 Amendments included Preven-
tion of Significant Deterioration (PSD) provisions 29  to ensure
declares that "each state shall have primary responsibility for assuring air quality"
within a state.
21. Within nine months of EPA promulgation of primary NAAQS for a pollutant,
a state must submit a SIP that provides for the implementation, maintenance, and en-
forcement of the NAAQS within the state. Clean Air Act § ll(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(1) (1982). The EPA must approve all SIPs. Section 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2).
22. The 1970 Amendments required that SIPs provide for attainment of primary
NAAQS "as expeditiously as practicable," but "in no case" more than three years from
the date the state filed the plan. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(A) (1982). Secondary NAAQS
were to be met within a "reasonable time." Id. Two year extensions are available upon
application to the EPA by a state governor. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(e) (1982).
23. New Source Performance Standards were to "reflect the degree of emission limi-
tations achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction"
that the EPA determined to be "adequately demonstrated." Clean Air Amendments of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1683 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411(a) (1982)).
24. Clean Air Act § 111(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b) 91982).
25. Congress defined a "new source" subject to NSRS as "any building, structure,
facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." Clean Air Act
§ 111(a)(2),(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2),(3) (1982). A modification subject to NSPS is
"any physical change in or change in method of operation" of a source "which increases
the amount of any air pollutant emitted by such source or which results in the emissions
of any air pollutant not previously emitted." Clean Air Act § 11 (a)(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1411(a)(4) (1982).
26. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977); 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524-25 (1976).
27. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8, 11, 12 (1977).
28. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
29. Clean Air Act §§ 160-69A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-91A (1982).
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nondegredation of air quality in regions that already had attained
NAAQS.3 ° The 1977 Amendments also included the nonattainment
area provisions at issue in Chevron.3 1 Congress intended the nonattain-
ment legislation3 2 to accelerate and ensure NAAQS attainment in re-
gions that failed to do so by statutory deadlines.33 Congress required
states to follow statutory guidelines to develop new SIPs with measures
to attain NAAQS as "expeditiously as practicable.", 34 One element of
the nonattainment provisions requires that states adopt permit pro-
grams that significantly limit construction of new or modified sources
in nonattainment areas." By the time a new or modified source begins
operation, total emissions, including the new source, must be less than
the emission levels present prior to applying for the permit. 36 Addi-
tionally the new or modified source emissions must be the "lowest
achievable.", 37
EPA implementation of the Clean Air Act reflects shifting environ-
30. The PSD provisions expressly state that they are intended to assure that any
decision to increase air pollution is made only after extensive analysis of the conse-
quences. Clean Air Act § 160(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(5) (1982). See also Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 346-64 (a comprehensive analysis of the development of the
PSD provision); Landau, Alabama Power Co. v. Costle: An End to a Decade of Contro-
versy Over the Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality?, 10 ENVTL. L. 585
(1980) (overview of legislative responses to deterioration of air quality and litigation on
the issue).
31. Clean Air Act §§ 171-78, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-08 (1982).
32. The EPA initiated the nonattainment area concept in 1976 when it issued an
interpretative ruling applicable to SIP requirements. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976). The
EPA issued the ruling in response to widespread concern about whether the EPA would
allow construction of new pollution sources in regions which did not meet NAAQS. Id.
at 55525. The EPA added, however, that Congressional action would be preferable on a
matter of such environmental and economic significance. "Believing that a statutory
clarification of the question [was] needed," Congress adopted the general approach of
the EPA in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 55 (1977).
33. Clean Air Act §§ 171-78, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-08 (1982).
34. Clean Air Act § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1982).
35. See Clean Air Act § 110(aX2)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(I) (1982) (no new con-
struction without permit); Clean Air Act § 173, 42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1982) (permit
requirements).
36. Clean Air Act § 173(IXA), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(1)(A) (1982).
37. Clean Air Act § 173(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(2) (1982). The 1977 Amendments
defined the "lowest achievable emission rate" as:
(A) the most stringent emission limitation which is contained in the implementa-
tion plan of any State for such class or category of source, unless the owner
or operator of the proposed source demonstrates that such limitations are not
achievable, or
1985]
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mental, economic and political concerns of the United States. The reg-
ulatory approach adopted by the EPA significantly affects the balance
between air quality improvement and associated economic and social
costs. In 1980 the EPA promulgated a definition of source for nonat-
tainment areas that subjected both individual point sources and entire
plants to construction permit requirements.38 One year later, however,
under a different administration, the EPA adopted a bubble concept
definition of source for nonattainment areas. 39 The new regulation al-
lows a polluter to increase emissions at one point within a plant, with-
out triggering expensive pollution control requirements, if less
expensive emission reductions elsewhere in the plant do not result in
increased net emissions.' Supporters of the bubble concept argue that
cost effective regulation, such as the bubble concept, is the most realis-
tic approach for inducing industrial cooperation to achieve environ-
mental goals.4" Critics of the concept, however, argue that it
(B) the most stringent emission limitation which is achieved in practice by such
class or category of source, whichever is more stringent.
Clean Air Act § 171(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7501(3) (1982).
38. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,743-45 (1980). The EPA's 1980 regulation employed a
"dual definition" of source. See id. at 52,696-97. The EPA defined a "stationary
source" as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any
air pollutant subject to regulation under the Act." Id. at 52,746. The regulations, in
essence, defined a "building," "structure," or "facility" to be an entire plant. Id. The
EPA, however, defined an "installation" as "an identifiable piece of process equip-
ment," thereby subjecting sources within a plant to regulation. Id.
The EPA provided two reasons for its use of the dual definition of source. First, the
EPA referred to the legislative history of the nonattainment provision to support its
conclusion that Congress intended to apply new source review to "the greatest extent
possible." Id. at 52,697. The EPA, therefore, chose the dual definition because it
"would bring in more sources for review than would the plantwide definition." Id.
Second, the EPA cited recent court decisions as evidence that the bubble concept was
inconsistent with the Congressional purpose behind the nonattainment provisions. Id.
39. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1)(i),(ii) (1984). The EPA justified its position reversal on
the bubble concept in two ways. First, the EPA indicated that the new regulation re-
duced regulatory complexity, "confusion and inconsistency." 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280-81
(1981). In a masterpiece of circular logic the EPA attacked the dual definition because
it forbid new construction or modifications on individual pieces of equipment "even
where no increase in emissions at the plant would result." Id. Second, the EPA stated
that adoption of the bubble concept flowed from the Congressional policy of state in-
volvement in Clean Air Act implementation. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766-67 (1981). The bub-
ble concept, the EPA contended, provided states with greater flexibility to meet the
mandate of the Clean Air Act. Id. One is left with the impression that "flexibility" is a
euphemism for reduced pressure on local industry to comply.
40. 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280 (1981); 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416-17 (1975).
41. See 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416-17 (1975); Landau, Economic Dreams or Environmen-
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encourages extended use of old and inefficient polluting equipment as
economically pressed heavy industry and utilities seek to avoid installa-
tion of expensive pollution control equipment as long as possible.42 The
bubble concept, ironically, puts industries that want to construct an
entire modem and efficient plant at a significant economic disadvan-
tage to established, inefficient industries.43 Implicit in this view is that
the bubble concept substantially prolongs NAAQS attainment.' In
addition, companies can use the concept as a delay tactic to wait for a
favorable Congressional amendment to the Act.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
circuit has reviewed4" EPA use of the bubble concept to define source
for three Clean Air Act programs. In ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA,46 several
industries,47 as well as the Sierra Club,48 petitioned for review of EPA
use of the bubble concept to determine applicability of NSPS. The
1975 regulation at issue49 applied NSPS to all newly constructed facili-
tal Nightmare? The Legality of the "Bubble Concept" in Air and Water Pollution Con-
trol, 8 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 741 (1980); Rhinelander, supra note 4; Comment, An
Overview of the Bubble Concept, 8 COLUM. J. oF ENVTL. L. 137 (1982).
42. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766, 50768 (1981). In 1980 the EPA itself criticized the bubble
concept definition of source because "the limited number of cost-effective opportunities
to reduce emissions will in fact be used to avoid review." 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,697
(1980).
43. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416-17 (1975).
44. 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,697-98 (1980).
45. See supra note 12.
46. 578 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
47. ASARCO, Incorporated, Newmont Mining Corporation, and Magna Copper
Company, all engaged in metal smelting. These industrial petitioners argued unsuccess-
fully that the EPA regulations should use the bubble concept in all instances to deter-
mine applicability of NSPS to new construction. ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 329.
48. The Sierra Club successfully argued that the EPA may not use the bubble con-
cept at all to determine applicability of NSPS. Id. at 326-29.
49. Section 111 of the Clean Air Act defines a "new source" as any stationary
source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the publication
"of NSPS for the type of source involved." Clean Air Act § 11l(a)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7411 (a)(2) (1982). Section 111 defines a "stationary source" as "any building, struc-
ture, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." § 11 l(a)(3), 42
U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(3) (emphasis added). The EPA proposed the definition in 1974, 39
Fed. Reg. 36,946 (1974) and announced its final rule in 1975, 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416
(1975). The EPA promulgated the regulation in response to critics' concern over how
much a polluter could modify existing equipment before becoming subject to NSPS. 39
Fed. Reg. 36,946 (1974). The EPA justified use of the bubble concept to exempt plant
modifications from NSPS as a way to give a plant owner "flexibility" to avoid large
control cost expenditures. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,416 (1975).
1985]
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ties,"° but allowed some changes5 within a plant to escape NSPS
under the bubble concept. The court held that any use52 of the bubble
concept to determine NSPS application was inconsistent with the stat-
utory language and purpose of the NSPS provisions of the Clean Air
Act.53 The court found that the EPA altered the statutory definition of
source for NSPS in a manner plainly contradictory to the language of
the statute.54 Furthermore, the court found that though Congress
designed the NSPS to enhance air quality, the bubble concept "at best
maintains the present level of emissions."55
The District of Columbia Circuit Court subsequently reviewed EPA
application of the bubble concept to PSD programs in Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle.56 The regulatory scheme,57 as in ASARCO, 8 exempts
50. See supra notes 24-25.
51. The EPA defines "reconstruction" by a complex formula tied to the relationship
between expenditures for the plant changes and the cost of total plant replacement. 40
Fed. Reg. 58,420 (1975). The EPA regulation subjected new construction and "recon-
struction" of a plant to NSPS, but did not subject less significant changes that did not
increase the total plant emissions. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,419 (1975).
52. 578 F.2d at 329. The opinion of the court in ASARCO stated that "any version
of the bubble concept is incompatible with the language of the Act and is contrary to its
purpose" (emphasis provided). Id. In subsequent cases, however, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit Court apparently has confined ASARCO to its facts when reviewing
other uses of the bubble concept. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gor-
such, 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (nonattainment areas); Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (PSD programs). One reason for the limita-
tion of the ASARCO holding may be that each of the three judges wrote an opinion
which varied on the appropriate degree of discretion the court should permit the EPA
to have. Judge Wright wrote the opinion for the court. Judge Leventhal concurred, but
argued that the EPA should have more latitude than Wright's opinion implied.
ASARCO, 578 F.2d 319 at 331. Judge McKinnon's lengthy dissent argued that the
EPA acted well within its "discretion in applying the bubble concept only to modified
and not to new or reconstructed facilities." Id. at 337.
53. 578 F.2d at 337, 329.
54. Id. at 338. The court found that the statutory definition of source for NSPS,
supra note 49, which defined a source as any "building, structure, facility, or installa-
tion," did not contemplate the regulatory definition that referred to a "combination" of
facilities as a source. Id. at 336.
55. Id. at 327-28. The court stated that the regulations at issue would "undercut
Section 111 by allowing operators to avoid installing the best pollution control equip-
ment as long as the emissions of the entire plant do not increase." Id. at 328. Signifi-
cantly, the court rejected the EPA's contention that the bubble concept was necessary
to provide plant owners flexibility. Id. Furthermore, the court rejected the rationale
that the bubble concept was necessary because of the allegedly greater cost of retrofit-
ting existing facilities compared to installation of pollution control equipment during
initial construction. Id.
56. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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plants from PSD requirements despite increased emissions from a mod-
ified emission point within the plant if net plant emissions do not in-
crease. 9 The court held that, in the absence of contrary Congressional
intent,6° the statutory definition of source for NSPS applies by analogy
to PSD programs. 61 The court stated, however, that the EPA has dis-
cretion to define components of the statutory definition differently for
NSPS and PSD programs.62 The court distinguished the purposes of
NSPS and PSD provisions, finding that Congress intended PSD provi-
sions to prevent increased pollution,63 whereas, it intended NSPS to
reduce air pollution. On that basis the court held that the bubble con-
cept must be used for PSD permit programs." The court supported its
conclusion by adding that the bubble concept is "precisely suited to
preserve air quality within a framework that allows for cost efficient
57. In general, EPA regulations for PSD programs are found in 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.21,
52.24 (1984). In the context of PSD programs the bubble concept arises out of a regula-
tory definition for "stationary sources" for which a construction permit is required in
PSD regions. See Clean Air Act §§ 165, 169(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7475, 7479(1) (1982).
The PSD provisions of the Clean Air Act do not expressly define "stationary source" or
"source" as do the provisions for NSPS. See supra note 25. The EPA defined a "statio-
nary source" for PSD purposes as "any structure, building, facility, equipment, installa-
tion (or combination thereof) which is located on one or more contiguous or adjacent
properties and which is owned or operated by the same person (or by persons under
common control)." 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(bX4), 52.21(bX4) (1978) (codified as amended
at 40 C.F.R. §§ 551.24(bX5),(6), 52.21(bX5),(6) (1984)). Standards for PSD review of
construction also apply by statute to the "modification of any source or facility." Clean
Air Act § 169(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(2XC) (1982). The Act further defines a modifi-
cation as a physical or operational change which "increases the amount of any air pollu-
tant emitted by such source." Clean Air Act § 11 l(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(aX4) (1982).
The EPA regulates only "major modifications" which it defines as those resulting "in a
significant net emissions increase," (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(2),
52.21(2) (1984)), thereby extending the bubble concept to plant modifications as well as
new construction.
58. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 57.
60. Unlike the NSPS regulations at issue in ASARCO, Congress did not provide an
express statutory definition of source for PSD provisions.
61. 636 F.2d at 395-96.
62. Id. at 396-98.
63. Id. at 401-02.
64. Id. at 401. The court indicated that failure to use the bubble concept under the
PSD provision would be "unreasonable and contrary to the expressed purposes of the
PSD provisions of the Act." Id. The court concluded that Congress intended to re-
quire construction permits "only where industrial changes might increase pollution in
an area, not where an existing plant changed its operations in ways that produced no
pollution increase." Id.
1985]
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flexible planning for industrial expansion and improvement., 65
The District of Columbia Circuit Court reviewed the use of the bub-
ble concept in EPA nonattainment area regulations in Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch." The Gorsuch court rejected
the main contention of the EPA that the bubble concept promotes the
purpose of nonattainment area provisions by granting states flexibility
in developing SIPs.67 The court reconciled ASARCO and Alabama
Power Co. by analyzing the purposes of the legislation at issue in each
case.68 The court's analysis yielded a "bright line test" to govern use of
the bubble concept in Clean Air Act programs.69 The court stated that
the bubble concept must be used in programs to maintain air quality,
but should not be used in programs to improve air quality.70 The court
applied the test to the nonattainment provisions of the Clean Air Act
and concluded that it is not permissible to use the bubble concept to
improve air quality in nonattainment areas.71 Accordingly, the court
vacated the EPA nonattainment area definition of source.72
The Supreme Court reversed Gorsuch in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.73  Initially, the Court ex-
plained the standard of judicial review for administrative agency deci-
sions.74 The Court stated that a reviewing court should defer to an
agency decision out of respect for agency expertise in the subject mat-
ter.75 The Court engaged in a two-part inquiry: first, did Congress
65. Id. at 402.
66. 685 F.2d 718 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
67. Id. at 727-28.
68. The court interpreted ASARCO as prohibiting use of the bubble concept because
it conflicted with the purpose of NSPS to improve air quality. Id. at 726. The court
viewed Alabama Power Co. as narrowing the scope of ASARCO. The court further
believed that Alabama Power Co. mandates court investigation of the purpose of the
specific Clean Air Act program at issue. Id. at 726 & n.27. Cf. supra note 53. The
court's facile reconciliation of ASARCO and Alabama Power Co. has been criticized as
an overly simplistic evaluation of the rationales in those cases. Reed, NRDC v. Gor-
such: D.C. Circuit Bursts EPA's Nonattainment Bubble, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 10,089, 10,094-96 (1982).
69. 685 F.2d at 726.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 726-27.
72. Id. at 728.
73. 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
74. Id. at 2781-83.
75. Id. at 2782. See also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275
(1978), in which Justice Stevens (author of Chevron opinion), dissenting, states that an
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express an intent to apply the bubble concept to nonattainment pro-
grams, and second, if not, was the Administrator's application of the
bubble concept reasonable.7 6
The Court searched for Congressional intent in the history of the
Clean Air Act." Finding no reference to the bubble concept prior to
the 1977 Amendments, the Court focused on the 1977 Amendments
themselves. 7' The Court specifically searched the legislative history for
any indications as to the purpose of the amendments or their intent
regarding use of the bubble concept.7 9 The Court concluded that Con-
gress designed the nonattainment program to "accommodate the con-
flict between the economic interest in permitting capital improvements
to continue and the environmental interest in improving air quality."8"
The Court further noted a desire on the part of Congress to allow states
to administrate nonattainment programs. 8'
The Court rejected the respondent's legislative history contentions.
It found them untenable, and explained that, if at all, the history sup-
ported the bubble concept.8 2 The Court found that the bubble, in fur-
thering economic growth, was related to one of the purposes
contemplated by Congress. 3
The Court then reviewed the language of the statute, but quickly
dismissed it as not dispositive.84 Throughout its inquiry, the Court re-
jected statutory interpretations submitted by the respondent as com-
pletely unpersuasive." Further, the Court viewed the EPA's shifting
policies as evidence of a flexible and, therefore, admirable policy
position. 86
administrative "contemporaneous construction" of a statute is entitled to considerable
weight. Id. at 287 n.5.
76. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
77. Id. at 2783-84.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 2786.
81. The Court focused on a statement of Senator Muskie which discussed the op-
tions available to states. Id. at 2787, citing 123 CONG. REc. 26,847 (1977).
82. Id.
83. Id. Nowhere does the Court examine the petitioners' interpretation.
84. Id. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
85. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
86. Id. at 2791-92. By contrast, the lower court was critical of EPA's shifting poli-
cies. Id.
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Finally, the Court dismissed all of the respondent's policy argu-
ments. 87 The Court stated that legislators and administrators, rather
than courts, should balance the competing interests that shape policy
decisions.88 EPA's judgment was reasonable, the Court held, because
"the agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fash-
ion."89 As a result, the Court deferred to EPA's judgment." The
lower court's judgment, impliedly made on the basis of the judges' per-
sonal policy preferences, disregarded the judicial duty to respect an
agency's legitimate policy choices.9
Chevron will be a very influential case. It is the first case to analyze
the bubble concept in four years, and stands as the only Supreme Court
decision addressing the issue. Unfortunately, the Court's analysis lacks
the depth needed to address such an important case. The Court cor-
rectly states that, because legislative intent about application of the
bubble concept is unclear,92 the Court must defer to the agency unless
its policy is unreasonable.93 The agency, however, bears the burden of
proof to show support for its contention that adoption of the bubble
concept is reasonable.94 Nowhere, however, does the Supreme Court
consider this. In fact, the Court appears to shift the burden to the
respondents. It never demands the EPA to meet its evidentiary bur-
den, but instead refutes respondent's contentions.95
The Supreme Court also did not adequately consider the evidence
itself. Stevens begins his legislative history with the 1977 amendments
because the Court, in effect, found no prior legislative mention of the
87. Id. at 2792-93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
88. Id. at 2793. But see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
89. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793. "The power of an administrative agency to admin-
ister a congressionally created and funded program necessarily requires the formulation
of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Con-
gress." Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974).
90. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2793.
91. Id.
92. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
94. It was EPA's failure to meet the burden of proving reasonableness that caused
the Court of Appeals, in part, to rule against it. 685 F.2d 718, 727 n.41 (D.C. Cir.
1982), rev., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
95. Additionally, the Court ignores the burden imposed on petitioners due to their
appeal of the lower court decision. The Court never examines why petitioners assign
error to the court of appeals' decision, let alone what proof they have to support their
contention.
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bubble concept.96 This is an apparent oversight by the Court and indi-
cates a cursory attitude. In addition, the Court, by summarily consid-
ering the 1977 amendments, did not carefully examine the intricacies of
the nonattainment provision.97 The Court chose to emphasize the eco-
nomic rationale for the amendments and did not consider their under-
lying environmental purpose.98 There were many objectives to the
1977 Amendments, and to choose the economic objective over all
others is an oversimplification. 99
The greatest omission, however, was in the Court's overview of
events subsequent to the enactment of the 1977 Amendments. The
Court expounded upon EPA's vacillating policy, yet completely ig-
nored the decisions in ASARCO and Alabama Power."°° The Court
never resolved the confusion surrounding their relationship, and indeed
never addressed the "bright-line test" derived by the lower court. 101 It
is surprising that the Supreme Court would render an opinion without
weighing the only two cases on point, let alone disregarding the test
used by the lower court.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 2785-86.
97. The legislative history reveals great confusion and many plausible rationales for
the amendments, as shown in the three opinions in ASARCO. See supra note 52. The
Court, however, finds no difficulty in selecting one possible reason for the amendments
and focusing solely upon it.
98. The Court erred in not considering the Act's environmental purpose. Once the
Court stressed the economic aspect over the environmental aspect, it easily changed the
Clean Air Act from an environmental law into an almost purely economic one. See
supra note 80 and accompanying text. Most likely the Court was following a prior EPA
publication which similarly distorted the Act. The Clean Air Act has conveniently been
transformed from a statute originally designed to keep industry from interfering with
efforts to abate air pollution into a statute that keeps pollution control from interfering
with industrial expansion.
99. The Court's heavy reliance on Senator Muskie's "economy versus pollution"
comments, see supra note 81, may be ill-placed. "The remarks of a single legislator,
even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history." Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311 (1979). Additionally, the Court ignores the goal of achieving
pollution control measures "as expeditiously as practicable." See supra note 34 and
accompanying text. Likewise, the technology-advancing requirements (such as LAER
and BACT) are ignored by the Court.
100. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text. While it may be within the
Court's discretion to ignore these decisions, the result is greater confusion in an area of
law begging for consolidation of judicial views.
101. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. The Court never applied the
test it articulated, that of the reasonableness of the agency's decision. The Court merely
decided the case by its own standards and then labeled the decision reasonable. In this
sense, the Court was mimicking the actions it disapproved of in the lower court.
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Finally, the Supreme Court refused to consider the respondents' pol-
icy arguments because the EPA "considered the matter in a detailed
and reasoned fashion."102 There is no evidence, however, that EPA
did any such research. The Court merely claims that EPA did so with-
out reference to any studies."0 3 Without legislative history or statutory
language, the Court did not have adequate information to resolve is-
sues concerning the bubble concept other than the Court's own sense of
logic."° Indeed, the Court's decision appears to be predicated upon
such an analysis.' 0 5
Considering the policy arguments now, one sees that, despite some
possible economic advantages to the use of the concept,' °6 a long-term
analysis militates against such use in nonattainment areas. Not only
does it create a risk of harm to nonattainment goals,' °7 but it also does
102. Chevron, 104 S. Ct. at 2792.
103. EPA's brief offers no proof of its "detailed studies." The only research EPA
.produced was a pair of "conclusionary, two-page comments, each alleging one specific
instance in which a modernization project was said to be retarded." Brief for Respon-
dent at 22, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
2778 (1984). EPA failed to produce even these limited materials for the lower court.
"EPA had failed to produce any study, survey, or support for the proposition that new
source review under the prior source definition 'retards improvement of air quality in
the aggregate.'" Id., citing Gorsuch, 685 F.2d at 727 n.41.
104. Both sides attempted to argue policy in their briefs, but the Court ignored such
attempts. See Brief for Appellant, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984); Brief for Respondent, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984).
105. "Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the Commission was
based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority
granted by Congress." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 224
(1943). See also Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), in which the Court stated that
it determines the weight of administrative rulings by "the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pro-
nouncements .... Id. at 140.
106. One report states that in a study done on the bubble concept's economic ef-
fects, 70 industries using the concept saved an average of two million dollars in environ-
mental costs. Industry Unsure Economic Incentives for Clean Air Will Work, A.P.C.A.
Hears, 11 ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 1857 (1980). The report, however, is deceptive. Any
industry can cut costs by dropping a program. No one doubted that the Clean Air Act
would impose cost increases. The point is that Congress felt these costs necessary. The
same is also true for EPA's claim that the bubble reduces administrative costs, since
EPA administers less by using the bubble. Again, however, Congress felt increased
costs were necessary in order to abate pollution.
107. There is fundamental error in calling the concept a "bubble," because EPA
regulates only "net" emissions which come from standard outlets, such as smokestacks.
EPA does not regulate "fugitive" emissions, such as those that escape from windows.
Additionally, EPA has also narrowed the definition of emission, ruling that any emis-
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not fit within the theory, 08 or regulation19 of nonattainment area pro-
grams. The bubble concept, as applied to nonattainment area pro-
grams, is neither practicable,"10 nor economical.'11
The Supreme Court in Chevron summarily washed its hands of the
"bubble concept" issue. The Court never resolved the issues of legisla-
tive intent, agency autonomy, or conflicting case history. The probable
effect of this case will be two-fold. First, EPA is now virtually free of
judicial scrutiny. Although a lower court still has the authority to re-
view EPA implementation of the Clean Air Act, this case sends a pow-
erful message to defer. Thus, EPA, and those who dictate its course,
will be able to advance almost any end, as long as it is accompanied by
the most tenuous reasoning. Second, Chevron will dissuade environ-
mental activist groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council
or Sierra Club, from challenging EPA action, because such a challenge
will probably be futile and costly. Without such challenges, however,
an important check on EPA environmental policy is lost. Fewer chal-
lenges to EPA, coupled with judicial deference, will allow use of the
sion under 25 to 40 tons per year (depending on type of emission) is "insignificant."
This means that EPA, in discussing "net emissions," is ignoring the combined fugitive
and "insignificant" emissions. Given that a "major source" produces emissions of over
100 tons per year, it is hard to understand why a source which emits almost half that
amount is "insignificant." See 46 Fed. Reg. 50,769 (1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 52.24
(1984)).
108. The goal of implementing pollution control measures "as expeditiously as
practicable" remains a priority for the EPA. EPA admitted previously that Congress
intended new source review to be "an important tool in the drive towards attainment of
ambient air quality standards." 45 Fed. Reg. 52,697 (1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 52.24 (1984)). The bubble, however, reduces new source review, and EPA has begun
to drop requirements that occur only a few times. 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (1981) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. § 52.24 (1984)). This approach will soon completely negate new source
review.
109. It is apparent that the bubble has slowed down SIPs, as evidenced by the nu-
merous extensions given for NAAQS deadlines. See Current Developments, 12 ENVTL.
REP. (BNA) 147-48, 739-41, 765-81 (1981).
110. The bubble concept will eat away nonattainment programs from the inside.
Previously regulated machines are now "modifications" and are not subject to new
source review if a company makes offsets elsewhere in its plant. Thus, incentives to use
environmentally efficient machines are gone. Further, with each state setting its own
standards, air quality will revert to pre-Act days when industry forum-shopped for leni-
ent laws. The states thus have no economic incentives to enforce strict laws. Finally,
the evertightening budget of agencies such as EPA guarantees less enforcement.
111. EPA will only impose new source requirements on new industries, thereby
disadvantaging new competition and creating a privileged group among already existing
industries. EPA shelters older industries by giving them a price advantage, because
they do not have to meet new requirements by updating their equipment.
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bubble concept to expand. Prior to Chevron, use of the concept al-
lowed industry to decrease emissions maintenance and to delay
NAAQS deadlines. Chevron removes virtually all restraints on the use
of the bubble concept. States will now consider the economies of a SIP
before considering its environmental impact, a priority for which the
Clean Air Act was not meant.
James M. Wasserman
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